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Emotion significantly strengthens the subjective recollective experience even when objective accuracy of the memory is not
improved. Here, we examine if this modulation is related to the effect of emotion on hippocampal-dependent memory
consolidation. Two critical predictions follow from this hypothesis. First, since consolidation is assumed to take time, the
enhancement in the recollective experience for emotional compared to neutral memories should become more apparent
following a delay. Second, if the emotion advantage is critically dependent on the hippocampus, then the effects should be
reduced in amnesic patients with hippocampal damage. To test these predictions we examined the recollective experience for
emotional and neutral photos at two retention intervals (Experiment 1), and in amnesics and controls (Experiment 2).
Emotional memories were associated with an enhancement in the recollective experience that was greatest after a delay,
whereas familiarity was not influenced by emotion. In amnesics with hippocampal damage the emotion effect on recollective
experience was reduced. Surprisingly, however, these patients still showed a general memory advantage for emotional
compared to neutral items, but this effect was manifest primarily as a facilitation of familiarity. The results support the
consolidation hypothesis of recollective experience, but suggest that the effects of emotion on episodic memory are not
exclusively hippocampally mediated. Rather, emotion may enhance recognition by facilitating familiarity when recollection is
impaired due to hippocampal damage.
Citation: Sharot T, Verfaellie M, Yonelinas AP (2007) How Emotion Strengthens the Recollective Experience: A Time-Dependent Hippocampal
Process. PLoS ONE 2(10): e1068. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001068
INTRODUCTION
One of the primary ways by which emotion modulates memory is
by intensifying the recollective experience associated with memory
retrieval. Subjects report an enhancement in the vividness of
emotional memories, as well as an increase in confidence, even
when accuracy per se is not enhanced [1],[2]. For example, a study
examining students’ recollection of the events of September 11,
2001 found that the accuracy for these memories did not differ
from memories for everyday events, in both cases declining over
time. However, ratings of vividness, recollection, and belief in the
accuracy of memory declined only for mundane memories [3].
Recently, brain-imaging studies have suggested a role for the
amygdala in emotion’s influence on the recollective experience
[2],[4],[5].
Here, we examine if the subjective recollective advantage
enjoyed by emotional memories is related to the effect of emotion
on hippocampal dependent memory consolidation. A wealth of
data [6]–[][8] indicates that neurohormonal changes in response
to emotional events activate b-adrenergic receptors in the
amygdala, which in turn enhances hippocampal-dependent
memory consolidation [9]. The effect of emotion on memory
consolidation raises the possibility that the subjective qualities of
memory are enhanced by emotion via this mechanism. If this is the
case, then since consolidation takes time, the enhancement in the
recollective experience for emotional relative to neutral memories
should increase following a delay. Second, if the emotion
advantage is critically dependent on the hippocampus, then
patients with hippocampal damage should not exhibit the intense
recollective experience normally reported for emotional memories.
Most studies that have examined the recollective experience for
emotional stimuli have tested memory at only one point in time
[1],[2],[4],[5] leaving it unclear whether the recollective advantage
for emotional materials is related to consolidation. We have recently
reported findings suggesting that the recollective experience of
emotional memories may benefit from a time-dependent process
[10]. However, in that study the time-dependent enhancement of the
recollective experience could not be dissociated from time-
dependent improvements of overall memory accuracy. In Experi-
ment 1 we examine emotion’s modulation of the recollective
experience immediately after encoding and 24hrs later.
In addition, because no previous studies have examined the
recollective experience for emotional stimuli in amnesics, it is
unclear whether the hippocampus is critical for producing the
subjective recollection advantage of emotional stimuli. Past studies
have shown that both the perception of emotional photos, as
indicated by ratings of arousal and valence, and the enhancement
in recognition accuracy with emotion, are intact in amnesic
patients [11],[12]. These results suggest that the hippocampus is
not necessary for enhanced memory accuracy of emotional events.
It remains unknown, however, if the same is true for the emotional
enhancement of the subjective experience of recollection, which
has been shown to be somewhat independent of the enhancement
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in accuracy [1], [3]. In a study examining patients with left
hippocampal and amygdala pathology, the severity of hippocam-
pal pathology was found to predict subjective reports of
recollection for neutral and emotional items alike, suggesting that
the hippocampus is critical for effective encoding of emotional and
neutral material [13]. However, since memory was only tested
immediately after encoding, no effect of emotion on memory was
detected in either controls or patients. In Experiment 2 we
examine the recollective experience for emotional and neutral
photos in amnesics and controls after a delay that is sufficient to
produce an emotion advantage in memory.
RESULTS
Experiment 1. 35 subjects (17 males, 18 females) were presented
with two different sets of 60 neutral photos and 60 emotional
photos from the International Affective Photo Series (IAPS) on two
consecutive days. Immediately after the encoding session on day
two participants were given a surprise recognition test including all
previously viewed photos and 120 new photos (60 emotional, 60
neutral). Subjective experience of recollection was measured both
by measuring recognition confidence and by asking for re-
member/know judgments.
First, we examined the effects of emotion on overall recognition
accuracy as measured using overall hits and false alarm rates
(collapsing across R and K responses) to calculate d’. A 2 (stimuli:
emotion, neutral) by 2 (time: immediate, 24 h) ANOVA revealed
that the stimuli type did not affect overall accuracy (F(1,34) = 2.28,
p.0.1). This is consistent with several previous studies that have
reported no effect of emotion on overall memory accuracy [1]–
[][3],[13]. There was a main effect of time (F [1,34] = 63.96,
P,0.0001) characterized by greater overall recognition accuracy
at immediate testing. Importantly, there was no interaction
between stimuli type and time (F[1,34] = 1.4, P.0.2).
To examine the effects of emotion on different types of
recognition responses we calculated ‘emotional difference scores’
which were the proportion of emotional stimuli in a given
condition eliciting a particular recognition response minus the
proportion of neutral stimuli eliciting that response. Larger
positive values of these difference scores indicate that emotion
has a larger beneficial effect on responding. We first examined the
effects of emotion on high and low confidence recognition
responses to determine if the effects of emotion were observed
for the most confidently recognized items as well as for the less
confidently recognized items. Second, we examined the effects of
emotion on remember and know responses to determine if
emotion enhanced the subjective experience of remembering or if
it influenced recognition in the absence of a feeling of recollection.
Finally, we examined the effects of emotion on recollection and
familiarity by conducting a model-based analysis of the confidence
and remember/know responses. The raw scores for each condition
and response type are included in Table S1.
Figure 1 presents the effects of emotion on high and low
confidence recognition responses. The figure indicates that the
emotion effects were restricted to the high confidence recognition
responses, and that they were larger for items studied 24 hours
earlier than those studied 5 minutes earlier. To quantify these
effects we conducted a 2 (time: immediate, 24 h) by 2 (confidence
responses: 6, 5) ANOVA on the difference scores for old items.
There was a significant interaction F [1,34] = 9.5, P,0.005 that
was characterized by a larger effect of emotion on high confidence
old judgments after a 24h retention interval than immediately after
encoding t [34] = 3.29, P,0.002, but no difference in emotion’s
effect on low confidence judgments over time. There were no
significant effects on responses to new items.
Figure 2 presents the effects of emotion on remember and
know responses, and indicates that the emotion effects were
observed for remember but not know responses, and that the effect
of emotion was larger after a delay. To quantify these effects we
conducted a 2 (time: immediate, 24 h) by 2 (response: remember,
know) ANOVA on the difference scores for old items. There was
a main effect of response F [34] = 6.08 P,0.05 which was
characterized by a greater effect of emotion on ‘‘remember’’
responses than ‘‘know’’ responses. There was also a main effect of
time which was characterized by a greater effect of emotion on old
items tested after a 24 hour delay compared to those tested after
a 5 minutes delay F [34] = 8.34 P,0.01. There was no interaction.
For new items, there was a larger emotion effect for know than for
remember responses, t [34] = 2.51 P,0.02, which reflected
a general response bias to respond ‘know’ to new emotional items
than new neutral items.
Figure 1. Differential effects of emotion on high and low confidence judgments over time. Confidence difference scores (Emotional-Neutral) for
old stimuli encoded either 5 min or 24 h prior to recognition test, and for new stimuli, receiving either a 6 (high confidence that the stimuli is old), or
5 (low confidence that the stimuli is old) response. (error bars = sem).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001068.g001
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To further quantify the effects of emotion on recognition
performance, we separated the effects of emotion on recollection
and familiarity-based responses. Recollection and familiarity were
estimated separately using the ‘‘remember/know’’ judgments and
the recognition confidence judgments. First, recollection was
measured as the proportion of old items receiving a remember
response minus the proportion of new items receiving this
response. Familiarity was measured as the probability of receiving
a Know response given that a stimulus did not receive a Remember
response, corrected for false alarms: K= (Khit/(1-Rhit))-(Kfa/(1-
Rfa) [14]. Second, confidence-based receiver operating character-
istics (ROCs) were plotted as a function of response confidence
[14], and estimates of recollection and familiarity were derived
using a least-squares method [15]. The model equation, P(‘old’|-
old) = P(‘old’|new)+R+(1-R) W (d’/2-ci)-W (-d’/2-ci), assumes that
recognition reflects the contribution of recollection (R) and a signal
detection based familiarity process. The variable d’ reflects the
distance between two equal-variance Gaussian strength distribu-
tions, ci reflects the response criterion at point i, and W is the
cumulative normal response function. To facilitate the comparison
to recollection, which was measured as a probability, each d’ value
was converted to the probability of a hit given a false alarm rate of
0.10.
To examine the effect of emotion on recollection and
familiarity-based responses we calculated the difference scores by
subtracting the recollection and familiarity estimates for neutral
stimuli from that of emotional stimuli for each participant and
condition. Scores were subjected to a 2 (response: recollection,
familiarity) by 2 (time: immediate, 24 h) by 2 (procedure: R/K,
ROC) ANOVA. There was a main effect of response (F
[1,34] = 8.45, P,0.01) that was characterized by a larger effect
of emotion on recollection estimates than familiarity estimates.
There was also a main effect of time (F [1,34] = 14.46, P,0.001),
which was characterized by a larger effect of emotion on memory
after 24 hours than immediately after encoding (Fig. 3). These
results are consistent with the analysis of the confidence and
remember/know responses and indicate that emotion selectively
enhanced recollection-based judgments in this task, and affects
memory to a greater degree after a time delay.
Experiment II . Nineteen healthy controls (nine males, ten
females) and five amnesic patients (three males, two females) with
bilateral hippocampal damage (either confirmed by volumetric
analysis of structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) (Fig. 4) or
suspected from etiological and behavioral profiles) were presented
with 60 neutral photos and 60 emotional photos from the
International Affective Photo Series (IAPS). Two hours later they
were given a surprise recognition test including all previously viewed
photos and 120 new photos (60 emotional, 60 neutral). Subjective
experience of recollection was measured as in Experiment 1.
The results were analyzed in the same manner as in Experiment
1. The raw scores for each condition and response type are
included in Table S2. We first examined the effects of emotion on
overall recognition accuracy as measured using overall hits and
false alarm rates (collapsing across R and K responses) for
emotional and neutral stimuli. A 2 (stimuli: emotional, neutral)
by 2 (group: patient, controls) ANOVA did not reveal a group by
stimuli type interaction (F[1,22] = 1.4, P.0.7), nor significant main
effects of stimuli type (F[1,22] = 2.58, P.0.1) or group
(F[1,22] = 2.74, P..01). This replicates previous studies showing
that amnesics do not differ from controls with regards to the effect
of emotion on overall recognition accuracy [11],[12], and indicates
that any differences in the effects of emotion on remember/know
and confidence recognition responses will not be due to differences
in overall sensitivity to the emotion manipulation.
Figure 5 presents the effects of emotion on high and low
confidence recognition responses. The figure indicates that the
control subjects exhibited an emotion effect only for high confidence
responses. In contrast, the amnesics exhibited a reduced emotion
effect on high confidence responses, and they showed an emotion
effect on low confidence recognition responses. To quantify these
effects we conducted a 2 (confidence responses: 6, 5) by 2 (group:
amnesic, control) ANOVA on the difference scores of old photos.
There was a confidence by group interaction F [1,22] = 4.41,
P,0.05 that arose because in the control subjects the emotion
advantage was significantly greater for high confidence responses
than low confidence responses t [18]= 4.09, P,0.001, whereas for
the patients, emotion had comparable effects on high and low
confidence responses t [4]= .22, P.0.8. Furthermore, the control
Figure 2. Differential effects of emotion on ‘‘remember’ and ‘‘know’’ judgments over time. Difference scores (Emotional-Neutral) for old stimuli
encoded either 5 min or 24 h prior to recognition test, and for new stimuli, receiving either a ‘‘remember’’ or ‘‘know’’ judgment. (error bars = sem).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001068.g002
Recollection, Amnesia, Emotion
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subjects tended to have a greater effect of emotion on high
confidence judgments than the patients t [22]= 1.78, P=0.09, while
the patients tended to have a greater effect of emotion on low
confidence judgments than the controls t [22]= 2.27, P=0.07.
There were no significant effects on the responses to new items.
Figure 6 presents the emotion effects for remember and know
responses. The figure indicates that in control subjects only the
remember responses exhibited an emotion advantage, whereas for
the amnesics both remember and know responses exhibited an
emotion advantage. A 2 (response: remember, know) by 2 (group:
control, amnesic) ANOVA on the difference scores for old items
revealed an interaction F [1,22] = 5.17, P,0.05 that arose because
in the control subjects the emotion advantage was significantly
greater for remember responses than know responses t [18] = 5.32,
P,0.0001, whereas for the patients emotion had comparable
effects on remember and know responses t [4] = 0.45, P.0.6.
Furthermore, the patients showed a greater emotional effect on
know responses than the controls t [22] = 2.5, P,0.02. There were
no significant effects on responses to new items.
As in Exp 1 estimates of recollection and familiarity were
derived based on remember/know judgments. ROC estimates
were not included because two patients’ ROCs did not span
a sufficient range to support parameter estimation. A 2 (response:
recollection, familiarity) by 2 (group: control, amnesic) ANOVA
revealed a significant interaction F [1,22] = 4.46, P,0.05 that
arose because in the control subjects the emotion advantage was
significantly greater for recollection estimates than familiarity
estimates t [18] = 6.35, P,0.0001, whereas for the patients
emotion had comparable effects on recollection and familiarity
estimates t [4] = 1.29, P.0.2 (Fig. 7). These results are consistent
with the analysis of the confidence and remember/know responses
and indicate that in controls emotion selectively enhanced
recollection-based judgments, whereas in the amnesics a compa-
rable emotion advantage was observed in both recollection and
familiarity-based responses.
DISCUSSION
The current experiments reveal several findings that are crucial for
understanding how emotion shapes memory for prior events. First,
we show that the relative enhancement in the recollective experi-
ence associated with emotion benefits from the operation of a time-
dependent process, consistent with consolidation. Moreover, the
advantage in recognition memory related to emotion is experi-
enced as recollection in healthy subjects. However, in amnesics the
beneficial effects of emotion on recollection was reduced, and
emotion began to enhance familiarity based recognition responses.
Figure 4. Anatomical images of amnesic patients. -T1 weighted
coronal MRI sections of two of the patients35,36. Images reveal
selective bilateral atrophy of hippocampus (a & d), and intact amygdala
(b & c).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001068.g004
Figure 3. Differential effects of emotion on recollection and familiarity estimates over time. Difference scores (Emotional-Neutral) for estimates of
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In both experiments we measured the subjective recollective
experience by measuring recognition confidence and by asking for
remember/know judgments. Aside from providing indexes of two
critical aspects of the recollective experience the methods were also
used to derive model-based estimates of recollection and
familiarity-two memory process thought to underlie recognition
performance [16]–[][18]. ‘‘Remember’’ and high confidence
judgments are thought to reflect recollection-based judgments,
while ‘‘know’’ and low-confidence judgments are thought to be
related to familiarity-based recognition judgments [18],[19].
Importantly, regardless of whether a model-based analysis (i.e.
estimates of recollection and familiarity) or a model-free analysis
(i.e. proportion of specific responses) was used, and whether
confidence judgments or remember/know judgments were
examined, the results converged on the same conclusions.
In Experiment I recognition confidence judgments and re-
member/know reports were collected at two retention intervals.
The findings showed that the relative enhancement in the
recollective experience of emotional memories compared with
neutral memories was larger after a delay. Although emotion’s
effects on attention and perception during encoding [20],[21] may
boost the recollective experience immediately [22],[23], the
present findings indicate that the relative emotional advantage
increases over time. The results of Experiment I are consistent
with previous results from our lab [10] and extend them in several
important ways. First, we show that the time-depended effects of
emotion on the recollective experience are not contingent on time-
dependent improvements on overall recognition accuracy. Second,
we show these effects using two different measures of the
recollective experience, demonstrating that the results are not
a by-product of one specific paradigm. The result suggests that
emotion elicits a mechanism that modulates memory retention,
resulting in greater vividness and confidence of memories for
emotional events relative to memories of neutral events after
a delay. This is consistent with the notion that the emotional
advantage in the recollective experience is due in part to slower
forgetting, and with the suggestion that the sluggish consolidation
of memories serves an adaptive function by enabling neurohor-
monal processes trigged by an arousing stimulus to modulate
memory strength over time [9].
Experiment 2 verified that in healthy individuals recollection-
based judgments, but not familiarity-based judgments, were
heightened with emotion [also see 1,2,4]. However, in amnesia
the emotional enhancement of recollection was reduced, and the
Figure 5. Differential effects of emotion on high and low confidence judgments in amnesics and controls. Confidence difference scores
(Emotional-Neutral) for the amnesic and control groups, for old and new stimuli receiving either a 6 (high confidence that the stimuli is old), or 5 (low
confidence that the stimuli is old) response. (error bars = sem).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001068.g005
Recollection, Amnesia, Emotion
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effect of emotion on recognition judgments began to manifest itself
as a facilitation of familiarity. As a result the patients exhibited
a larger emotional advantage in familiarity-based recognition
judgments than the controls. Past studies of amnesics with
hippocampal damage have found a normal effect of emotion on
recognition accuracy [11],[12]. The current findings are consistent
with these results, but they reveal that emotion does not influence
recognition in the same way as in healthy subjects. Whereas in
healthy subjects the effects of emotion extend mostly to
recollection, impaired function of the hippocampus proper still
allows preferential recognition of emotional material by way of
familiarity in the absence of recollection. Thus, an intact
hippocampus may not be necessary in order to lead to a normal
overall memory advantage for emotional compared to neutral
items, because when the hippocampus is damaged the emotional
advantage that usually affects recollection now benefits familiarity-
based recognition.
The effects of emotion on recognition observed here can be
interpreted within dual process and single process theories of
recognition memory. Although the study was not designed to
differentiate amongst those classes of models it is useful to consider
the results in light of those theoretical approaches. From the
perspective of dual process models the current results are consistent
with previous work indicating that it is the process of recollection that
is particularly sensitive to the effects of emotion [1],[2],[4]. The
current results further indicate that these beneficial effects of emotion
are time dependent, as expected if this process is involved in
consolidation. In addition, the results indicate that the effects of
emotion are not limited to recollection in the sense that when
recollection was disrupted by amnesia emotion began to affect
familiarity. We speculate that emotion will also enhance familiarity-
based recognition in healthy individuals whenever recollection is
unavailable, for example when attention is limited.
In contrast, by single process models in which recognition is
assumed to be based on a global measure of memory strength, the
results suggest that the effects of emotion on recognition memory
can be observed even when emotion does not have a pronounced
effect on overall memory strength. That is, the d’ analysis of
recognition accuracy indicated that emotion did not have large
effects on overall recognition sensitivity. Thus, the observation that
emotional items began to attract more remember and high
confidence responses than nonemotional items, and that the effect
of emotion on remembering was altered in amnesia can’t be
explained as reflecting differences in overall memory strength.
Rather these differences must have occurred for different reasons
such as shifts in response criterion for emotional compared to
neutral items, or increases in the relative variance of the emotional
items compared to neutral items. One possibility is that
consolidation may preserve the memory strength of some
emotional items more so than others, thus giving rise to a relative
Figure 6. Differential effects of emotion on ‘‘remember’ and ‘‘know’’ judgments in amnesics and controls. Difference scores (Emotional-Neutral)
for the amnesic and control groups, for old and new stimuli receiving either a ‘‘remember’’ or ‘‘know’’ judgment. (error bars = sem).’’
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001068.g006
Recollection, Amnesia, Emotion
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increased variance for the studied emotional compared to neutral
items. In any case, consistent with the dual process account, it is
clear that the effects of emotion on recollective experience, as
measured by reports of remembering and high confidence
responses, are significantly modulated by delay and by medial
temporal lobe damage. Future studies examining autobiographical
memories are needed to verify that these effects generalize to
‘‘real-life’’ situations.
On the basis of the current results, we speculate that the
amygdala supports a time-dependent consolidation of emotional
memories, but that the manner in which it contributes to
recognition depends on the availability of recollection and
familiarity signals from other medial temporal lobe regions.
Namely, when recollective information from the hippocampus is
available, memory associated with emotional aspects of the event is
experienced as recollection, whereas under conditions in which
recollection is compromised, performance relies more on famil-
iarity information originating from other regions such as the rhinal
cortex [24]. Although future studies are required to determine the
precise neural mechanism by which emotion facilitates familiarity
when recollection is impaired, studies in non-human animals have
identified a neural pathway that may underlie such facilitation.
Specifically, strong bi-directional projections between the amyg-
dala and the rhinal cortices (i.e perirhinal and entorhinal cortices)
have been identified in non-human primates [25]. Furthermore,
studies in cats suggest that strength of the interaction between the
perirhinal and entorhinal cortices may be increased by amygdala
activity [26]. The rhinal cortices make up the chief path for
impulse traffic to and from the hippocampus. It is possible that in
the absence of incoming recollective signals from the hippocampus
to the rhinal cortices and amygdala, the connectivity between the
amygdala and rhinal cortices is strengthened, possibly facilitating
familiarity. This is also consistent with a previous brain imaging
study suggesting that amygdala activity mediates familiarity of
stimuli previously experienced in an emotional context [27].
One should note that in three of our amnesic patients, bilateral
ischemic damage to the hippocampus with sparing of adjacent
areas could not be confirmed by MRI. These were cardiac arrest
patients that suffered a brief period of hypoxia and had
defibrillators that prevent the use of high resolution brain scans
to quantify the cortical atrophy. The hippocampus is one of the
brain regions that is particularly vulnerable to hypoxic-ischamic
damage [28],[29]. However, other brain regions can also be
affected, including the thalamus and the watershed regions in the
cerebral cortex and cerebellum [30]. It is therefore impossible to
determine with complete certainty which brain regions are
affected in these patients. However, in cases in which the cognitive
impairments are limited mainly to memory, as in the current
patients, postmortem neuropathological analysis [28].[31] and
volumetric neuroimaging [32] show that the hippocampus is the
primary structure influenced by hypoxia and is the most probable
source of the memory deficits. Furthermore, the behavioral
profiles of the hypoxic patients for whom MRI scans were not
available were similar to those of the hypoxic patients for whom
bi-lateral damage confined to the hippocampus was confirmed by
MRI, suggesting similar damage in both cases. Thus, the data
suggests that the hippocampus is involved in the enhancement in
the feeling of recollection, but not familiarity, of emotional stimuli.
Figure 7. Differential effects of emotion on recollection and familiarity estimates in amnesics and controls. Difference scores (Emotional-Neutral)
for the amnesic and control groups, for estimates of recollection and familiarity (see method for details). (error bars = sem).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001068.g007
Recollection, Amnesia, Emotion
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In sum, our results suggest that the advantage in the recollective
experience related to emotion is supported by a time-dependent
mechanism, consistent with consolidation. However, although the
hippocampus plays a role in strengthening the recollective experience
for emotional events, the effects of emotion on recognition are not
exclusively hippocampally mediated. Rather, emotion may enhance
recognition by facilitating nonrecollective recognition when recollec-
tion is disrupted due to hippocampal damage.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Experiment I: 35 undergraduate students at the University of
California Davis participated in the study (age range 18 to 22; 18
females). All participants gave informed consent and received
course credit for their participation. The study was approved by
the committee on human research at the University of California.
An ANOVA (time6difference scores6gender) conducted to
examine the influence of gender on the results did not reveal
a significant interaction on confidence scores [F [2,33] = 0.27,
P = 0.77], R/K judgments [F [2,33] = 0.04, P= 0.96], or ROC
scores [F [2,33] = 0.74, P= 0.49].
Stimuli consisted of 180 negatively arousing photos, and 180
neutral photos, selected from the International Affective Photo
Series (IAPS), based on their standard scores for emotional arousal
and emotional valence [33], and from our own set of neutral
pictures to equate the two sets for the presence of humans and
visual complexity [2]. Photos were rated in a previous study for
valence and arousal [2]. Valence was rated on a scale from 1
(positive) to 9 (negative). Neutral photos were rated as neutral
(mean=3.75, SD=1.07) and emotional photos as negative
(mean=7.69, SD=0.52); t [10] = 14.23, P,0.0001. Arousal was
rated on a scale from 1(not at all arousing) to 9 (very much
arousing). Neutral photos had lower arousal ratings (mean= 3.03,
SD=0.83), than emotional photos (mean= 6.79, SD=1.15); t
[11]) = 10.67, P,0.0001.
The arousing negative photos had more categorical overlap
than the neutral photos (such as mutated bodies). However, this
difference can not explain our findings because the current
paradigm was designed to look at changes in the effect of emotion
on memory in different conditions (retention time and group). The
categorical overlap exists in all these conditions (immediate and
delay testing, amnesics and controls) and thus will be subtracted
out in the analysis.
Participants viewed stimuli in two sessions separated approxi-
mately by 24 hs. In each session participants were presented with
60 neutral photos and 60 emotional photos. Different sets of
emotional and neutral photos were presented on each day. Sets
were counterbalanced across participants. On each trial a photo
was presented for 1 s, after which the participant had 2 s to rate
the photo for visual complexity, then a fixation cross appeared for
6 s. The trials were separated into four blocks of 30 trials each.
The subjective experience of recollection was measured both by
measuring recognition confidence and by asking for remember/
know judgments [19]. Immediately after the encoding session on
day two, participants were trained to make remember/know
judgments [34]; after reading the detailed instructions they were
asked to explain the instructions in their own words, and were then
given practice trails to verify that they fully understood the
difference between a ‘‘remember’’ and ‘‘know’’ judgment. During
the practice trials participants were asked to verbally justify their
‘‘remember’’ responses. Once the experimenter was assured that
the participants understood and were following instructions (i.e.
‘‘remembered’’ stimuli were ones that evoked a specific memory
for the episodic context in which the stimuli was experienced, such
as a thought, feeling, or sensory detail) they were given the
recognition test. The recognition test included the presentation of
360 photos: 60 old negatively arousing photos presented the
previous day (day 1), 60 old negatively arousing photos presented
that day (day 2), 60 old neutral photos presented on day 1, 60 old
neutral photos presented on day 2, 60 new negatively arousing
photos, and 60 new neutral photos. Thus, memory was tested both
for photos presented a few minutes prior to the recognition test,
and those presented 24 hrs earlier. Stimuli were presented in
a random order on a computer screen. Each trial consisted of the
presentation of a photo for 2 s, followed by 3 s to indicate whether
the photo was new, ‘‘remembered’’, or ‘‘known’’, by pressing the
appropriate key. Then the participants had 3 s to rate the
confidence of their recognition response on a scale from 1 to 6. A
‘6’ response indicated that they were sure it was studied, a ‘5’
indicated they were unsure it was studied, and a ‘4’ indicated that
they were guessing that it was studied. A ‘1’ response indicated
that they were sure it was not studied, a ‘2’ indicated they were
unsure it was not studied, and ‘3’ indicated that they were guessing
that it was not studied.
Experiment 2: Nineteen healthy controls (nine males) and five
patients (three males) participated in the study. The controls were
selected to be matched in age (controls = 52.39, patients = 53.6,
P..05), and education (controls = 15.29, patients = 15, P..05) to
the patient group. Bilateral ischemic damage to the hippocampus
was confirmed by structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI),
with sparing of adjacent medial temporal lobe structures, including
the amygdala, in two patients (Fig. 4). Patient AM1 suffered an
ischemic episode several years prior to testing with no other
significant neurological history [35]. Patient AM2 had an asthma
attack fifteen years prior to testing, followed by grand mal seizure.
Together, these led to an anoxic encephalopathy that led to a dense
anterograde amnesia [36]. Both their intelligence quotients (109,
100), as well as their performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test (six categories each) were normal, but they were severely
impaired on tests of long-term memory (both had WMS-R delay
scores,50). The rest of the patients were cardiac arrest patients
who suffered a brief period of hypoxia associated with coma with
no prior history of brain pathology. The patients had defibrillators,
which prevented the use of high-resolution brain scans to quantify
the cortical atrophy. Bilateral hippocampus damage was suspected
from etiological and behavioral profiles [37]. With the exception of
memory impairments, the patients were cognitively intact. Their
intelligence quotients (100, 110 and 119) were normal. Moreover,
on the WMS-R they were normal on the attentional subscale (97,
100 and 125), but impaired on the delayed memory subscale (87,
77 and 77). All participants gave informed consent and were paid
for their participation. The study was approved by the committee
on human research at the University of California.
Estimates of medial temporal lobe damage for patients AM1
and AM2 were based on quantitative analysis of magnetic
resonance images, as reported previously [38], in which volumes
for each patient were compared to those obtained of 4 age- and
gender-matched control subjects. The medial temporal structures
were segmented individually as described previously [39]. The
parahippocampal gyrus was defined anteriorly by the isthmus of
the temporal and frontal lobes, medially by the collateral fissure,
laterally by the hippocampal fissure, and posteriorly by the
anterior limit of the calcarine fissure. A computer program,
XVOL, was used to determine the volumes of the units of interest.
The volumes obtained for each unit were summated for all slices in
which each unit appeared. Data were normalized for individual
variation in intracranial vault volume, which was estimated using
Brain Extraction Tool (BET) from the FMRIB Software Library
from Oxford University [40].
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AM1‘s hippocampal volume fell close to 2 SDs below the mean of
controls (Z=21.8) whereas AM2’s hippocampal volume fell more
than 2 SDs below the mean of controls (Z=26.5). In comparison,
the volume of the parahippocampal gyrus (temporopolar cortex,
perirhinal, entorhinal, and parahippocampal cortices) was not lower
than average for both patients (Z= 2.4 and .3, respectively).
An ANOVA (gender6difference scores6group) conducted to
examine the influence of gender on the results of Experiment 2 did
not reveal a significant interaction on confidence scores [F
[2,20] = 0.3, P= 0.86], R/K judgments [F [2,20] = 1.2,
P = 0.27], or ROC scores [F [2,20] = 0.39, P = 0.53].
Stimuli consisted of 120 negatively arousing photos, and 120
neutral photos, selected from the same pool of photos as in
Experiment 1 (see Experiment 1, methods).
Participants were presented with 60 neutral photos and 60
emotional photos. On each trial a photo was presented for 1s, after
which the participant had 2s to rate the photo for visual
complexity, then a fixation cross appeared for 6s. The trials were
separated into four blocks of 30 trials each.
Two hours after the encoding session participants were trained
at making a ‘‘remember’’/’’know’’ judgment [34] and were given
a recognition test. The 2 hour delay period was chosen instead of
the 24h delay period used in Exp 1 to avoid floor effects of overall
recognition performance of the amnesics and controls, who were
older than the young adults tested in Exp 1. Previous studies have
shown that this delay is sufficient to lead to an enhancement of
memory with emotion [2], [35]. The recognition test included the
presentation of 240 photos; 60 old negatively arousing photos, 60
old neutral photos, 60 new negatively arousing photos, and 60 new
neutral photos. Stimuli were presented in a random order on
a computer screen. Each trial consisted of the presentation of
a photo for 2s. The participant then had unlimited time to indicate
whether the photo was new, ‘‘remembered’’, or ‘‘known’’, by
pressing the appropriate key, and to rate the confidence of their
recognition response on a scale from 1 (high confidence new
photo) to 6 (high confidence old photo).
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Table S1 Proportion of confidence responses and remember/
know judgments for emotional and neutral photos seen either
5min or 24h prior to recognition test, or new.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001068.s001 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Table S2 Proportion of confidence responses and remember/
know judgments for old and new, emotional and neutral photos, in
the amnesic and control groups.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001068.s002 (0.04 MB
DOC)
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